Amy's Terrorism Issues Blog

updated October 10, 2008

The post below, based on an article about a recent Biometrics conference, mistakenly attributes a comparison between "cockroaches" and "enemies" to Ltc. Col. Brian Hunt. Hunt has let me know that the attribution to him in the original article was incorrect -- it was someone else at the conference who said it. I apologize to Ltc. Hunt for the inaccuracy and have stricken the entire section referencing it, from the blog (below). I'd note though, that someone else may have said it, and my own dismay at the analogy, made by anonymous, stands.

Reporter Patrick Marshall's review of the 2008 annual Biometrics Consortium Conference, "Biometrics Moves Past 'What If" and into "How To," offers a revealing look at the evolution of biometric tools in the context of the U.S. war on terror.

Biometry is the use of statistical analysis to interpret biological data. While a basic biometric tool, fingerprinting, has been traced to the 14th century, computer aided techniques propelled the field significantly in the last quarter of the 20th century. Post-9/11 security fears helped make biometric identification acceptable stateside, while Iraq war offered the U.S. military a testing ground for emerging technologies. (Wired's Noah Shachtman gave a lively account of the process of fingerprinting and iris scanning in Fallujah in 2007.)

Main points of the speakers at the Conference included:

• Sophisticated biometric technology already exists.
• The military is looking ahead to implementation both overseas and in the United States, at its domestic command, Northern Command.
• Interoperability and data sharing are high priorities. Interoperability means that different databases speak with each other; the military also wants to make sure there are technicians capable of using biometric recording devices in countries the U.S. cannot enter.

The upshot: The government is working toward the day when databases containing biometric data of as many of the world's citizens as possible can be shared across national borders. The data is suppsed to help let most of us move freely, while tagging bad guys (criminals, militants), regardless of where they travel.

And then, there is also this blip in the otherwise clipped technical language of the conference technocrats: the comment of Lt. Col. Brian Hunt, chief of the operations division of the Army’s Biometrics Task Force, comparing enemies to cockroaches:

Hunt said the biggest problem is in the field, where troops are collecting biometric data on suspected or known enemies. “They are like cockroaches,” Hunt said of the enemies, noting that warfighters have to go into the “dark spots” to collect biometric data.

Presumably Hunt meant to evoke the ability of roaches to scuttle quickly out of reach. But I could not help being reminded of the use of animal metaphors to dehumanize enemies in a few of the 20th centuries' most terrible conflicts. Yes, in those conflicts, in Rwanda, in Nazi Germany, the victims were innocent; here they may well be criminals, or militants plotting terrorist acts. But those facts don't put their humanity in question. Hunt's unwitting commentary suggests the care with which we should integrate biometric technologies into our societies. Criminals or innocents, the technology slices us all into parts and pieces--retinas, fingertips, irises, faces, DNA--perhaps making it difficult to remember what binds us.

Much has been said, of late, about how little we know about whether the surge in Iraq-a temporary increase in troops last year designed to quell violence-worked. This is because no one, even General Petraeus, who is credited as the force behind the surge's success, really knows how to interpret why violence subsided in Baghdad and elsewhere following the influx of U.S. troops. Like reality in general, reality in Iraq is a product of multiple forces acting together, and even randomly.

One of the other forces credited with helping quell violence are the "Awakening Councils," created by Sunni tribes who decided of their own volition to turn against Al Qaeda in Iraq, and halt resistance activities against the U.S. military presence. They joined forces with the Americans, who sweetened the decision by funding tribal heads to arm and pay fighters in the Western province of Anbar and elsewhere.

However, no one has known how the newly armed Sunni tribes would ultimately function in the Shiite led government.

The answer is: Badly, according to Abu Azzam, the commander of the Awakening movement, in an interview with The Nation. On Wednesday, October 1, responsibility for the Awakening Movement was transferred from the United States to Maliki's government. The Sunni group does not expect to be helped by the Shiite government, which is reportedly carrying out arrests and assassinations of Awakening members.

"Maliki tells the Americans what he thinks they want to hear," an Awakening leader tells The Nation. "I tell the Americans all the time that it is a trick, but they don't understand. The Americans are so naïve. They assume good will on the part of Maliki. We don't understand. The Americans know that Maliki is working closely with the Iranians, so why do they believe him? Why do they listen to him?"

The upshot, from the United States perspective, should be that Iraq is a fragile state indeed. "The bottom line is that despite the deceptive calm in Iraq, the country remains poised to explode," writes Dreyfuss, reminding readers that there are not only Sunni-Shiite rifts, but contentious Kurdish aspirations, and complicated negotiations between the United States and Iraq that could tip Iraqi politics.

For their part, American voters can use such news to understand that both presidential candidates are campaigning on simplified, if not simplistic, claims.

McCain shuts down conversations about the future in Iraq by trumpeting that the "surge worked," which is becoming a less and less meaningful phrase as time passes. And Obama's rallying cry that he'll end the Iraq war for Americans, if more forward looking, should not be taken to mean that mean the Iraq war will end for Iraqis, nor that the subsequent evolution of Iraq's domestic politics and regional alliances won't matter for the United States.

When a new administration rolls out their plan for Iraq, we should look for their willingness--in fact, their intention--to create policies that have some strategic reach, and seek to acknowledged these complexities.

Role of Informants Will also Be on Trial

In early May 2007, American newspapers reported the startling news that six men had been arrested for conspiring to kill soldiers at Fort Dix, in New Jersey. The case of the Cherry Hill, New Jersey residents, portrayed by law enforcement as a case of homegrown "Islamic extremism" garnered intense interest.

When the trial begins following jury selection this week, however, the informant who helped break the case may be scrutinized as closely as the defendants. He is being portrayed as the instrument of a government that has become overly zealous in seeking terrorism arrests.

The Case

The FBI began tracking the men, four ethnic Albanians, a Turk, and a Jordanian born American, when a video store clerk reported that men had brought in a video tape of themselves shooting assault rifles at a range while yelling about jihad, asking for its transfer to DVD.

The FBI infiltrated the group, and informants eventually produced a narrative based on taped conversations. They said they had watched terrorist training videos, collected assault weapons, and overtly discussed their desire to kill as many soldiers as possible. Although the four men reportedly were eager to act on behalf of a self-proclaimed "jihad," none were apparently observant, according to neighbors in New Jersey.

The six men "planned to purchase rocket-propelled grenade launchers and use tem to fire at Humvees at Fort Dix and light the whole place up,'" according to U.S. Attorney Chris Christie, quoted in the New York Times.

Eventually the men turned to one of the informants with the hope he would lead their plot to fruition. And several of the men were arrested while trying to buy assault weapons from him.

Fast forward to September 2008. The government is now prepared to begin the trial of Serdar Tatar, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, and Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka, who are brothers. All five are accused of murder and conspiracy to murder uniformed military personnel.

Informant's Role Questioned

In the meantime, the defense has brought into question whether the informant, Mahmoud Omar, an Egyptian national on probation, recorded--or actually led--the men into a conspiracy.

According to Geoff Mulvihill in an AP report:

Defense lawyers have portrayed Omar as the mastermind of any plot that existed and show that most of their clients were oblivious to any plan.

Michael Riley, who is representing Shain Duka, said the defense will probably play more, and longer, snippets of recorded conversations than prosecutors will. The defense will try to show that while their clients may have liked to shoot guns and held anti-American views, they were not moving ahead with a plan to kill.

"Our guys are saying, 'What are you talking about?'" when an attack is mentioned, Riley said.

How do terrorist groups end?

Two researchers, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, set out to find the answer empirically. They examined 684 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. Here's what they found, as Jones reported in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on September 18:

• 43% of groups ended terrorism when members adopted non-violent tactics and joined the political process
• 40% ended when local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members of the group
• 10% ended as a result of military force
• 7% achieved victory

Religious groups whose violence comes to an end are similarly unmoved by military force. Only 16% of these ended because of military force. Generally, "local police and intelligence services" are responsible for bringing their actions to an end (73%).

Michael Scheuer, a retired CIA official and the author of several books on the "war on terror," offered a briskly stinging rebuke to essentially everything the United States is doing to counter Al Qaeda, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18:

The government of the United States continues to fight an Islamist terrorist enemy--in al-Qaeda and its allies--that does not exist in the form Washington sees it; is not motivated by the factors Washington ascribes to it; and will not be defeated by the military forces and political toos Washington is deploying against it.

Scheuer's basic line of argument is that the United States has completely failed to grapple with the sole motivation of Al Qaeda, and the basis for its support:

...their perception that U.S. foreign policy is a deliberate attack on Islam and Muslms. From our enemies' perspective, therefore, this is preeminently a religious war, nothwithstanding the blather to the contrary of Western politicians, academics, policy makers and pundits.

Despite my appreciation for Scheuer's unmatched ability to take down government pieties about the war on terror, in less than a dozen words, I would maintain with the blatherers (as I have previously) that it is not quite right to call this a religious war and leave it at that.

Read more...

A car bomb exploded at the American Embassy in Yemen on Wednesday. So far, there appear to have been sixteen casualties people, six guards, four civilians and four attackers. Initial reports by reporters said that there was a second explosion following, and that an exchange of fire followed, when attackers dressed in policy uniforms pulled up to the scene and began to fire on the guards. A CNN reporter nearby reported he heard three explosions:

Briton Trev Mason told CNN from Sanaa that he heard at least three big explosions around the embassy from his nearby residential compound.

"We heard the sounds of a heavy gunbattle going on. I looked out of my window and we saw the first explosion going off, a massive fireball very close to the US embassy," he said.

"The gunbattle went on for a further 10 to 15 minutes followed by two further loud explosions," he said.

The gunfight included the use of RPGs and hand grenades.

A group called Islamic Jihad in Yemen has taken responsibility for the attacks. The group also took responsibilty for an attack in Yemen in July. There are competing reports of the groups affiliations. Some maintain that the group has close ties to Al Qaeda, while others say it has none. The group, formed in the early 1990s, recruited heavily from Arab mujahideen, Arabs who had fought with Afghans in the Afghan-Soviet war.

Deep Commitment, Shallow Understanding

Republican Vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin demonstrated deep commitment to combating terrorism, coupled with a strikingly shallow understanding of international relations and current military engagements, in her first televised interview on ABC on September 11.

The interview was one of several to be aired by ABC in September. In the first, Charles Gibson questioned Palin on Iraq, Iran, and other foreign policy issues.

Palin's answers to these questions appeared to be shallow and autonomic, which was unfortunate, because she passed up opportunities to share with the country--and the world--what she knows and how she conceives foreign policy and national security. Despite a reputation for being independent minded, Palin sounded much as President Bush has since 2001 when she repeatedly described the Middle East and Central Asia as if it held one unified group of terrorists "hell-bent" on destroying America, rather than multiple, distinct actors and conflicts.

This mashing together of different groups has not served the United States well. Among other issues, using a "war on terror" lens to view specific local issues (not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the Philippines and Indonesia, for example) does not produce locally effective policies. Also, when the current administration describes distinct conflicts as a function of a vague, all encompassing terrorist threat, it reflects extremely badly on the United States--it is heard as ideological and aggressive and, sorry to say, simply ignorant.

Palin described herself, above all, as so capable that she could make a decision without blinking. Were she to become president, her ignorance would more likely leave her particularly vulnerable to advisers who do have strategic understanding and well-plotted aims in the region.

As a vice president likely to be watched closely, Palin would play a role that makes how she speaks important. She would inevitably serve as an important ambassador of American intentions in the broader world. A great deal of that world has turned hostile to the United States and will respond poorly to either simplistic assumptions or blanket advocacy of American aggression.

Asked about whether she believes in the Bush Doctrine, Palin responded:

I believe that what President Bush has attempted to do is rid this world of Islamic extremism, terrorists who are hell-bent on destroying our nation. There have been blunders along the way, though.

Granting Palin the fact that words spoken spontaneously do not always sound so logical once transcribed, her first words on national security reveal that she has little pre-existing sense of words such as terrorism (which includes violence or the threat of violence), and extremism. Her dramatic rhetoric was in keeping with McCain's (against which a similar charge of fuzziness could be leveled).

In another exchange over whether the United States has the right to make cross-border attacks in Pakistan, Palin seemed completely unaware that Special Operations Forces just did, drawing a negative response among Pakistan's leadership and on the street, with such vehemence that new rounds of American flag burning have commenced. The entire exchange on Pakistan:

GIBSON: Do we have the right to be making cross-border attacks into Pakistan, from Afghanistan, with or without the approval of the Pakistani government?

PALIN: As for our right to invade, we’re going to work with these countries, building new relationships, working with existing allies, but forging new also, in order to, Charlie, get to a point in this world, where war is not going to be a first option. In fact, war has got to be and military strike a last option.

GIBSON: But governor, I am asking you, do we have the right, in your mind, to go across the border, with or without the approval of the Pakistani government?

PALIN: In order to stop Islamic extremists, those terrorists who would seek to destroy America, and our allies, we must do whatever it takes, and we must not blink, Charlie. In making those tough decisions of where we go, and even who we target.

GIBSON: And let me finish with this. I got lost in a blizzard of words there. Is that a yes, that you think we have the right to go aoss the border, with or without the approval of the Pakistani government? To go after terrorists who are in the Waziristan area?

PALIN: I believe that America has to exercise all options in order to stop the terrorists who are hell-bent on destroying America, and our allies. We have got to have all options out there on the table.

In response to two different questions, Palin answers simply that there are terrorists and that the United States maintains the right to deal with them as it sees fit. Another potential opportunity lost: to consider the legal ramifications of invading sovereign countries; the impact of military moves; alternative options at the Afghanistan / Pakistan border; or the difficulties of constructing such options. She passed up these opportunities.

Palin's experience, especially in foreign policy, has been of concern to some. There is a more worrying issue however, and it is her apparent lack of curiosity, or real interest, about the world beyond her own.

Experience can be learned. But imagination, generally, cannot, and imagination is the true basis for reform.

To reform, after all, is simply to make something new out of what we have. To do that, our national leaders must understand well the ingredients of the world we have, and be able to imagine them in a new way.

Learn more about Alaska Governor Palin's views and background:

• Profile of Sarah Palin (Justin Quinn, U.S. Conservative Politics Guide)
• McCain, Palin Contradict Gen. Petraeus (Deborah White, U.S. Liberal Politics Guide)
• Palin's Nomination Acceptance Speech
• Sarah Palin, Polarizing American Views (Women's Issues Guide)

_{Photo: Alex Wong / Getty Images}

It is the seventh anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Commemorations remembered the victims in New York and Washington; presidential candidates agreed to resist partisanship to show their national solidarity; and many Americans took stock of what they were doing that day and what the day means to them. At the same time, fewer Americans fear a terrorist attack than they have in recent years, and most do not think terrorism is as important a voting issue this fall as the economy or the housing crisis. Still, the attacks of that day have become a national, indeed, a global symbol potent enough to be invoked merely by mentioning the day.

What story lies within the symbol has not yet been decided. Some saw in it a declaration of war, some see it as prompting a war, or several. For some, 9/11 prompted a recognition that much of the world is unfree, for others, it became a symbol of hard-won liberties reduced. There are Americans who saw in the tower's collapse a sign that the United States must venture into the world beyond, and for others, it was proof that it should not.

Read more...

A New York Times article on how everyday Egyptians view the events of September 11, 2001, says as much about the United States as it does about Egypt.

Everyday Egyptians, from the point of view of most Americans, sound like full-blown conspiracists: Many don't believe that Al Qaeda, or Arabs, acted alone. They think the United States or Israel may have helped plan the event. The U.S. was looking for a reason to invade Iraq, and snatch its oil. Jews didn't go to work in the World Trade Center that day, proof of a Zionist connection. From the Times: "Asked how Jews might have been notified to stay home, or how they kept it a secret Read more...

The suicide rate among U.S. soldiers is nearly at a record high, according to news released last week. Last year, 115 soldiers committed suicide, and there are likely to be more this year.

Although several proximate causes have been cited, such as unemployment (following return from deployment) and family stresses, the underlying cause of the increase is repeated deployments, as the Army acknowledges Army Secretary Pete Geren said the military was fully aware that repeated deployment was the cause of higher levels of distress and anxiety for soldiers and their relatives. "The Army is committed to ensuring that all soldiers and their families receive the behavioral health care they need," Geren promised. ^{(U.S.Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall)}