Rep. Mike Pence (R-IN) visited
the Green Zone in 2005
One of the first of many powerful passages in Rajiv Chandrasekaran's book about the protected area that has housed the Coalition soldiers during the Iraq War, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone, is that of the U.S. soldiers' mess hall.
The food—Fruit Loops and crisply fried bacon—was American; the décor—stackable chairs and glass covered buffet tables—was American. And the story that made the U.S. presence there make sense, that was American too:
A mural of the World Trade Center adorned one of the entrances. The Twin Towers were framed within the outstretched wings of a bald eagle. Each branch of the U.S. military—the army, air force, marines and navy—had its seal on a different corner of the mural. In the middle were the logos of the New York City Police and Fire departments, and atop the towers were the words THANK GOD FOR THE COALITION FORCES & FREEDOM FIGHTERS AT HOME AND ABROAD.
Four years after the U.S. invaded a country that posed no pressing security threat, and which had no meaningful connection to the World Trade Center attack, public debate still rages on about how American policy makers, and a supportive public, made the decision to go to war.
The image of the mess hall gives an answer, though it goes unmentioned in the daily back-and-forth about who thought what about the intelligence made available at the time.
The decision played out a story based on emotion more than intelligence or rational thought. The decision to go to war was made in the American gut, where the compelling and terrifying image of America's virility in literal meltdown lodged itself as fear and as wish in the year after 9/11. The wish was for a clear and visible enemy to take responsibility for the tragedy. Saddam Hussein and Iraq fulfilled that wish (so much easier to take down than a roving movement of unclear size or definition). Every man and woman – American and Iraqi – who passed through the Coalition mess hall was fed daily the myth that fighting in Iraq meant fighting the 9/11 attackers.
We are learning about the power of would-be terrorists to create compelling messages and alluring images on the Internet, even to manufacture viscerally compelling video games that truncate logic and gain support for unworthy goals.
We need also to learn about the power of our own storytelling machinery, and of our own susceptibility to illogic and myths that make us feel better when times are bad. Vigilantly, insistently, seeking to see reality—even when it doesn't offer up clear answers, or doesn't provide the muscular image of America we seem to like best--is a real pre-emptive strike on behalf of U.S. security. Otherwise, we may end up giving up real lives and real resources to fight on behalf of an illusion.
Also see my colleagues' excellent commentaries on the meaning of the fourth anniversary of the Iraq War: Iraq War Enters Fifth Year (U.S. Foreign Policy) | Iraq War Four Years Later, Conquering, Not Helping? (U.S. Liberal Politics) | U.S. and Iraq Citizens Views of War (U.S. Politics)
Comments
Amy, your take on storytelling is spot on, IMO. It leaves out only one thing (possibly) — and that is the root (origin) of the story.
In the US, the root is usually found deep in Judeo-Christian myth. In this example, I believe that the country followed the path of the god of the old testament, a vengeful god, rather than the god of the new testament, a forgiving (turn the other cheek) one.
The result has been devastating for the average Iraqi and will prove, I’m afraid, devastating for generations to come in America (caring for the wounded – a lifetime effort — and paying for this credit-card-war).
Kathy,
Thank you for that thought provoking comment. I can certainly see the roots of the America you describe (I’m reminded of the 18th century Calvinist pastor Jonathan Edwards’ famous “You are Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” sermon.)
I wonder though, whether it isn’t also possible to see American history (and policy) as tending back and forth between these two visions, or as a country often in which both are often in tension? Perhaps the New Deal era can be described as a forgiving moment, while the national security state ethos that followed reflects a country perceived as reflecting the world of a wrathful and awesome divinity.
Best wishes,
Amy
A very interesting story. You might want to take your own advice on learning about the power of your own storytelling. Your story says the decision to go to war was made in the American gut.
Perhaps you forgot the United Nations Security Council voted to authorize the use of force. America, last I checked, only has one vote on that council. Maybe you also forgot that the UN Security Council stated that Iraq was in violation of the 17 or so resolutions and that failure to comply could result in military action. I suppose you also forgot that many of these resolutions were passed BEFORE 9/11. In fact, the official U.S. Policy of regime change in Iraq not only pre-dated 9/11, but also pre-dated the Bush administration. Yes, regime change in Iraq was official policy during the Clinton administration, and there were numerous House and Senate resolutions supporting this as well.
That being said, it really was a great story, it just needs to start out, “Once upon a time…”
Dear Jerry,
Thank you for your comment. There’s no question, as you point out, that the U.S. government has had a long interest in regime change in Iraq (in fact, that option was passed over in 1991 in the first Persian Gulf War).
The decision to effect that regime change was made, however, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, and justified in the public mind by an alleged connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda(and to the presence of WMD). That connection did not exist–it was a fiction. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration told us that Iraq posed an imminent threat to national security on these grounds. A significant percentage of the American public believed there was a connection between the 9/11 attacks and the Iraqi regime at the time the war began.
Regime change in Iraq could be debated on its own merits, but ithas muddied the water to connect the Iraq war to the “war on terrorism” and has confused efforts to understand and address jihadist movements in the region.
I hope this clarifies, and thank you for reading.
Actually, President Bush stated that we should act on Iraq BEFORE they become an imminent threat. It was Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee John Edwards that claimed that Iraq WAS an imminent threat.
You’re right. John Edwards did say publicly that Iraq was the most imminent threat to the U.S., and Bush relied on the concept of pre-emptive strike. Still, the justifiability of a strike on those grounds (the imminence of an imminent security threat) would ideally be based on verifiable evidence.
Thank you for the comment,
Amy