Chasing Militants across other Countries' Borders
North Pakistan tribal leaders speak with Pakistani army
generals in February 2007. The two parties agreed
in September 2006 to stop fighting between Pakistani
forces and the Taliban, but the Taliban and Al Qaeda
presence remains strong. The potential consequences of U.S.
direct military action are unknown. (John Moore/ Getty Images)
The spin cycle in politics and journalism now whirs at such speed that recent, still classified, events are rapidly subject to hindsight analysis. To wit, the New York Times reported this weekend on an aborted 2005 U.S. plan to strike Al Qaeda leaders in North Pakistan.
The military explores—and scraps—potential plans on a regular basis. What makes this one special is the reason given: the U.S. feared damaging political relationships with Pakistan, whose position as an ally in the war on terrorism has been complex. The Bush Administration's political reluctance to approve military action, in this instance, against Al Qaeda is sure to be compared to similar reluctance during the Clinton administration (as indeed it already has been by officials quoted on the second page of the article).
The comparison actually provides a fruitful opportunity for dropping the lens of partisanship that clouds good analysis, and taking a closer look at the issue. Both a Democratic and a Republican president have been challenged by the complexity of pursuing non-state militants in foreign sovereign territory. The pursuit of non-state actors like Al Qaeda inevitably will pit military opportunities to effectively strike adversaries against political necessity of maintaining a system of alliances with other states. This is a puzzle worth thinking about, since the next president, regardless of party, will face exactly the same issue.
Also of interest: How Militancy is Made: the Case of the Pakistan Bombings | Afghanistan and Pakistan Bicker over Who Does Less to Stop Terrorism