Bioterrorism Threat Is Disputed
William R. Clark, the chair emeritus of immunology at the University of California, doesn't think that bioterrorism is a serious threat, right now. He just wrote a book on the politics of bioterrorism called Bracing for Armegeddon? In an interview with Matt Palmquist in May, Professor Clark explained how he really feels about reports of a bioterrorism threat:
The more I looked into it, I thought, "Jeez, what are these guys talking about?" What are the odds that a terrorist group, no matter how well financed, would be able to create a bioterror weapon? I began looking into what it takes to really make a successful bioterrorism agent, and I just became very skeptical of this whole thing. The (United States ) military gave up bioweapons 30 years ago. They're too undependable; they're too hard to use; they're too hard to make. Then I started checking around, and I found there's a whole literature out there of people who've been screaming for years that this whole bioterrorism thing is really overblown; it's not practical; it's never going to work. Aum Shinrikyo couldn't get it to work; those guys put millions and millions of dollars into it. So you think of a bunch of guys sitting in a cave in Afghanistan — they're sure as hell not going to do it. Is any government going to do it? No. So that made me very skeptical, and I went back to Oxford and said, "This whole thing's a crock.
Other commentators disagree entirely. In Congressional testimony earlier this week, Jeffrey W. Runge, MD, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), made the case that: "The risk of a large-scale biological attack on the Nation is significant. We know that our terrorist enemies have sought to use biological agents as instruments of their warfare, and we believe that capability is within their reach." He amplifies:
We have determined that al-Qaeda seeks to develop and use a biological weapon to cause mass casualties in an attack on the homeland. Our analysis indicates that anthrax is a likely choice; and a successful single-city attack on an unprepared population could kill hundreds of thousands of citizens. A coordinated attack on multiple targets would come much closer in magnitude to our enemy's goal. Because of this, we see the threat of an aerosolized anthrax attack as our number one bioterrorism concern, and it is that threat which we vigorously plan, invest and intend to defeat. Our efforts are not optional or discretionary. The ramifications of such an attack include tremendous loss of life, economic costs, damage to critical infrastructure, and unprecedented environmental contamination.
It's hard to know who to believe, when disagreement is so strong. Personally, I come down on believing that there is a plausible threat, based on past evidence. I'd also buy that this threat has been magnified by institutions that have a vested interest in holding on to the massively increased funding made available for bioterrorism research after September 11. It rose from the hundreds of millions of dollars in 2001, to $2.5 billion in 2002, when President Bush signed a bill funding the Department of Health and Human Services. New grants and other projects are also underway. I don't mean to suggest that anyone in the government or elsewhere would ever maliciously magnify a bioterrorism threat. But it is human nature to protect our interests and organizations (made up of humans) tend to follow suit.
Comments
Those who believe a biological threat is a “crock” need only read BioHazard by Ken Alibek. The soviet Union believed BW made sense. They developed well over 200 tons of a weaponized anthrax/smallpox. Iraq purchased anthrax strains from our own American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) More importantly, tell Robert Stevens’ family that BW is a crock and the other 4 families of the people who died. The development of these materials are simple to obtain. If a group of guys are willing to hijack planes and run themselves into buildings, who says they won’t infect themselves with smallpox then travel through US airports for several weeks. Sorry Mr. Clark, I strongly disagree with your “Crock”
The death of Robert Stevens and the other victims of the 2001 anthrax letters is indeed a tragedy.
Just to clarify on that case, as far as I know it has not been resolved.
Thanks for your comment,
Amy
Biological weapons need not be complicated or have elaborate dispersion technology. People infected with highly communicable diseases are a near perfect and proven means of infecting large populations as seen from historical epidemiology.
These weapons need not be directed at people; targets can be symbolic or economic.
I have also read Runge’s testimony and commented here. Right now, the US govt is spending an average of $5 billion a year on biodefense efforts. It is overblown - people should not compare the former Soviet Union’s BW program to Aum Shinrikyo’s, al Qaeda’s, or the Amerithrax incident.
Killing 5 people, infecting 22, and panicking thousands is nothing compared to the US/USSR former BW programs. In fact, the ability to culture, produce, and most importantly, weaponize a quantity of BW agent to be able to cause mass casualties is quite difficult. It becomes a public policy question - do we spend billions on responding to bioterrorism when it never happens, year after year, or do you spend the same public funds on responding to indigenous diseases like influenza, TB, cholera, etc, which continue to kill thousands every year?
I have been involved with BT Response in the public sector since 1999. I think Mr. Clark underplays the threat but I agree that there has been waste through the grant process. We need to abandon the hysteria and limit our spending to common-sense, sustainable programs that make sense.
I believe one of the biggest benefits society can receive from the BT grants is the ability to distribute mass quantities of antibiotics (prophylaxis) and vaccines in an emergency situation. This ability would be needed for non-Bt events such as a pandemic influenza outbreak. However, most jurisdictions are pursuing Points of Distribution (POD) models that are costly to create and maintain.
The regional “Mega-POD” is the design that most urban and metropolitan jurisdictions are investing in. The Mega-POD model requires a large infrastructure to maintain it in a state of readiness. A model utilizing numerous, small, neighborhood PODs could be created and maintained far more efficiently.
While I highly respect Dr. Clarks’ opinion, I have to disagree with his premise that bio-agents are to difficult to produce and disseminate, and that it would take millions of dollars to effect a result. Aum Shinriko used the wrong agent and the perpetrators weren’t “martyrs”.
The cost involved to produce an agent capable of impacting one hundred thousand people or more, would be in the thousands of dollars, not millions. There is no shortage of volunteers needed to disseminate an agent that is readily availiable or can be mass produced in a short period of time. To believe that the liklihood is small is, in my estimation, a soothing salve applied to terminally cancerous lesion that will relieve the symptoms while not affecting the ultimate outcome. It’s comming. Be prepared.