Could Iraq be Headed for Civil War, Part II?

Much has been said, of late, about how little we know about whether the surge in Iraq-a temporary increase in troops last year designed to quell violence-worked. This is because no one, even General Petraeus, who is credited as the force behind the surge's success, really knows how to interpret why violence subsided in Baghdad and elsewhere following the influx of U.S. troops. Like reality in general, reality in Iraq is a product of multiple forces acting together, and even randomly.

One of the other forces credited with helping quell violence are the "Awakening Councils," created by Sunni tribes who decided of their own volition to turn against Al Qaeda in Iraq, and halt resistance activities against the U.S. military presence. They joined forces with the Americans, who sweetened the decision by funding tribal heads to arm and pay fighters in the Western province of Anbar and elsewhere.

However, no one has known how the newly armed Sunni tribes would ultimately function in the Shiite led government.

The answer is: Badly, according to Abu Azzam, the commander of the Awakening movement, in an interview with The Nation. On Wednesday, October 1, responsibility for the Awakening Movement was transferred from the United States to Maliki's government. The Sunni group does not expect to be helped by the Shiite government, which is reportedly carrying out arrests and assassinations of Awakening members.

"Maliki tells the Americans what he thinks they want to hear," an Awakening leader tells The Nation. "I tell the Americans all the time that it is a trick, but they don't understand. The Americans are so naïve. They assume good will on the part of Maliki. We don't understand. The Americans know that Maliki is working closely with the Iranians, so why do they believe him? Why do they listen to him?"

The upshot, from the United States perspective, should be that Iraq is a fragile state indeed. "The bottom line is that despite the deceptive calm in Iraq, the country remains poised to explode," writes Dreyfuss, reminding readers that there are not only Sunni-Shiite rifts, but contentious Kurdish aspirations, and complicated negotiations between the United States and Iraq that could tip Iraqi politics.

For their part, American voters can use such news to understand that both presidential candidates are campaigning on simplified, if not simplistic, claims.

McCain shuts down conversations about the future in Iraq by trumpeting that the "surge worked," which is becoming a less and less meaningful phrase as time passes. And Obama's rallying cry that he'll end the Iraq war for Americans, if more forward looking, should not be taken to mean that mean the Iraq war will end for Iraqis, nor that the subsequent evolution of Iraq's domestic politics and regional alliances won't matter for the United States.

When a new administration rolls out their plan for Iraq, we should look for their willingness--in fact, their intention--to create policies that have some strategic reach, and seek to acknowledged these complexities.