Why Not Negotiate with Terrorists- -Pros and Cons of Talking to Al Qaeda

The U.S. says that it does not negotiate with terrorists. Yet addressing Al Qaeda with military means alone is not working. As of early 2007 – over five years since the U.S. went to wage war on terrorism -- Al Qaeda is reportedly resurgent in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now, according to former CIA bin Laden unit head Michael Scheuer, Al Qaeda is planning spectacular comebacks that include radioactive attacks, possibly on U.S. soil. Careful observers have argued that the problem is in large part the Iraq war; a New York Times editorial calls Al Qaeda's resurfacing "a devastating indictment of Mr. Bush's grievously flawed strategies and misplaced Iraq obsession."

Countering Al Qaeda Will Take More than Military Might

Challenging Al Qaeda's regeneration will take more than a refocused military force. Bruce Hoffman, a highly regarded counterterrorism expert, said in written testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities in February 2007, that defeating Al Qaeda requires recognizing that "al Qaeda cannot be defeated with military means alone."

By this, Hoffman (and many others in the intelligence community) mean that the U.S. must also fight a 'war of ideas.' Hoffman calls this "countering the continued resonance of the radical's message and breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment." This includes trying, for example, to figure out how to deal with Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups' use of the internet to showcase their activities and promote their ideas. Some of this work is done in the U.S. intelligence community, but other work is a function of State Department public diplomacy, such as an initiative in which Arabic speakers post comments on international blogs that are perceived to be anti-American propaganda.

Why not take the concept of diplomacy even further? The State Department idea of posting on blogs may seem silly or trivial, but it is also a rare gesture toward open dialogue. Nevertheless, resolving conflict by blogging might take a very (very) long time. Why not go straight to dialogue and negotiate with Al Qaeda's leadership (Osama bin Laden, assuming he's alive, or Ayman Al Zawahiri or another deputy, if he is not). Lay out everyone's demands on the table and see whether a diplomatic solution to quell violent conflict can be laid out.

Sound crazy? Countries at war talk with each other, and so do states and violent non-state actors. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) agreed to disarm after British – Irish – paramilitary groups talks concluded with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Journalist Jonathan Freedland makes the case that Israel should talk to Palestinian Hamas.

Proponents of negotiation begin with the premise that neither the U.S. nor Al Qaeda can "win"their battle with each other in any meaningful way. The United States, with or without allies, will never be able to eradicate Al Qaeda, or its offshoots. Al Qaeda has no serious chance of fundamentally uprooting the United States.

This does not mean there might not be significant damage along the way: a long war of attrition by Al Qaeda could exhaust the American military, a significant chunk of its economy and the electorate and, not least, lead to the death of innocents caught in the crossfire. Al Qaeda could acquire, and use, nuclear materials. In fact, the physical damage of radioactive weapons such as a dirty bomb can be sustainable. But their use would undoubtedly prod the U.S. to escalate conflict to a point that most of us would rather not imagine.

The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda also cannot take place in a vacuum. It inevitably engages other actors and countries, which adds to the general instability caused by conflict.

The high stakes—the potential that generations after ours may inherit an inordinately expensive conflict, in lives and resources, that cannot be won—make it worth exploring the possibility of diplomatic or political solutions.