Why Not Negotiate with Terrorists- -Pros and Cons of Talking to Al Qaeda

Negotiation = Weakness

From the standpoint of the Bush Administration, Al Qaeda often represents an absolute radical Islamist "evil" which by its nature seeks the destruction of the U.S. Negotiations would therefore be not only unproductive, but provide Al Qaeda with evidence of American weakness, and fuel its ability to attack the U.S.

Negotiating with Al Qaeda rewards terrorist activity and destabilizes honest political systems

In a March 2007, the Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College, Peter R. Neumann, laid out the basic argument for why democracies should not negotiate with violent non-state actors:

"Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations grant legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Negotiations can destabilise the negotiating governments’ political system, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent."

There is no Way to Enforce a Truce with a Terrorist Group

Neumann, as well as others, have suggested there is little hope that a negotiated resolution with Al Qaeda would last. The difficulty of enforcing a truce is not unique to Al Qaeda, as the Spanish experience with ETA in late 2006, and the continual back-and-forth tug between Israel and Hamas.

According to Neumann:

In some cases, such as al Qaida, the chances for a negotiated solution may be slim. Osama bin Laden has offered ceasefires to governments in the United States and Europe, but it is unclear whether the organisation’s local commanders would honour them. There is no sign that al Qaida has changed its thinking on the utility of violence, and it is hard to conceive of a viable process of primary negotiations in which the organisation could be included.

Al Qaeda Appears to Be Suggesting the U.S. Negotiate

Allen Zerkin, a research fellow at New York University's Center for Catastrophic Preparedness and Response, suggested in 2005 that Al Qaeda has a specific set of negotiable goals. To those who "argue that … the real goal is imposing Islam on the West," Zerkin responds:

Maybe. But what if, instead, Al Qaeda's agenda is what its leaders repeatedly say it is: an end to the Western military presence in Muslim lands, to "uncritical political support and military aid" to Israel, and to support of corrupt Middle Eastern regimes. Most scholars of Islam argue that because jihad is a defensive concept, the attacks on us must be understood as retaliation for perceived provocations, and that Al Qaeda's stated agenda — which has been consistent since 1996 — should be taken literally.

Journalist Peter Taylor has also observed that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's statements in the last ten years reveal a finite set of objectives, and that, "surprisingly, the word "caliphate" (a pan-Islamic state under sharia law") is barely mentioned.

Although issued in the language of threat, the words of Al Qaeda's deputy leader Ayman Al Zawahiri in December 2006 have been interpreted as indicating a willingness to negotiate: "It seems that you [the United States] will go through a painful journey of failed negotiations [in Iraq] until you will be forced to return to negotiate with the real powers."

All solutions must be tried before AQ gets Nuclear Weapons

The consistent indications that bin Laden seeks nuclear materials make it imperative that the United States keep all options on the table, including negotiation. The first imperative of national and global security should be preventing harm, and every route to safekeeping citizens' lives should be sought.

Negotiations Are an Assertive, Strong, Moral Gesture, not an Indication of Weakness

It's well acknowledged that the United States has alienated both its own and the world's citizens by waging an ill-considered war in Iraq, while continuously failing to grasp how the rest of globe sees the sole superpower. Genuinely contemplating possible political engagement with Al Qaeda would show that the United States has a serious interest in being part of the peaceful world order and democratic system it promotes. By leading by example, the U.S. could establish the ethical high ground on which it is currently slipping so perilously.