The Transportation Security Authority (TSA) was created following the September 11, 2001 attacks to strengthen airline security and other public transportation systems. According to Jeffrey Goldberg there's nothing strong about the TSAs airport security methods, from patting down passengers to checking for liquids to the "no fly" list designed to catch passengers whose names are on government watch lists.
Goldberg, working with security expert Bruce Schneier, tested his theory that nearly TSA measures are a show for the public by getting through American airports with counterfeit boarding passes, contraband like box cutters and liquids, and symbolic items such as Hezballah flag without any problem (you can read his report of his experiment in the November 2008 Atlantic magazine). He calls it "security theater" -a public display that does nothing to actually keep people safe, while wasting an enormous amount of money.
Most compellingly, he (and Schneier) explain how someone who wants to can get around the system designed to catch suspects on no-fly lists. Schneier explains that there are three points at which passengers engage with either the government or the airline--at the point of purchse, in the security line and just before departure when the boarding pass is checked.
The goal is to make sure that this ID triangle represents one person,” he [Schneier] explained. “Here’s how you get around it. Let’s assume you’re a terrorist and you believe your name is on the watch list.” It’s easy for a terrorist to check whether the government has cottoned on to his existence, Schneier said; he simply has to submit his name online to the new, privately run CLEAR program, which is meant to fast-pass approved travelers through security. If the terrorist is rejected, then he knows he’s on the watch list.
To slip through the only check against the no-fly list, the terrorist uses a stolen credit card to buy a ticket under a fake name. “Then you print a fake boarding pass with your real name on it and go to the airport. You give your real ID, and the fake boarding pass with your real name on it, to security. They’re checking the documents against each other. They’re not checking your name against the no-fly list—that was done on the airline’s computers. Once you’re through security, you rip up the fake boarding pass, and use the real boarding pass that has the name from the stolen credit card. Then you board the plane, because they’re not checking your name against your ID at boarding.”
Schneier concludes that "the country would be just as safe as it is today if airport security were rolled back to pre-9/11 levels," writes Goldberg.
Poor resource -that is, taxpayer money- allocation and minimal effect on security are only two of the most damning consequences of Goldberg's conclusions. What he calls security theater has other effects as well. It costs passengers money and time in inconvenience. It reminds people to be fearful, which has not only psychological but potentially negative physical consequences.