The United States certainly did not invent sectarian splits between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq or Muslim communities. But it may choose to publicly reinforce anxieties about Shiite Iran and about a Sunni / Shiite divide in its effort to solicit regional support for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The 2003 U.S. decision to remove the formerly dominant, but minority Sunni Baath party from major Iraqi institutions, such as the army and education, contributed to the current sectarian violence.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates described the behavior of Iran, a designated state sponsor of terrorism, as "worsening" in a New York Times report on January 15, while discussing an upcoming trip to the Middle East. Additonally, "Senior Pentagon officials said they also plan to stress to the largely-Sunni Arab governments worried about Iran that they must assist the United States in Iraq with reconstruction aid and with putting pressure on fellow Sunnis to reach political reconciliation."
Iran and Iraq maintain relations
Despite the distinct, and simple, assignations the U.S. government makes in official statements: Iraq=good; Iran=bad, relations between the three are not so simple. Iraq and Iran maintain important trade ties. Iraq is a large consumer of Iranian goods, and Iranian tourists trek in large numbers to visit important historical Shiite sites. In early January the two countries signed a new security agreement with each other. Iraq's Foreign Minister,
Hoshayr Zibari, is pressing the United States to release Iranians identified as
Revolutionary Guard members captured in a raid in northern Iraq last week. So far, the Iraqi government has been unable to persuade the U.S. government that the Iranians were working openly to handle trade related paperwork for Iraqis in the north.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: U.S. and Iranian dissident group MEK
For its part, the United States has not sworn off all Iranians. Indeed, Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), a state department designated terrorist group that switched from anti-Shah to anti-Ayatollah sentiments following the 1979 Islamic revolution, provides intelligence to the United States from its base in Northern Iraq. Indeed, in one of those wonderful twists of irony that international politics so readily provides, a number of U.S. policy makers and think tank experts support MEK, and contemplate the Iranian dissident group as the key to American and Sunni rapprochement in Iraq. A speaker for the Iran Policy Committee, for example, suggested recently that:
"One way to overcome the acrimony between the U.S. Government and Sunni politicians is to utilize an interlocutor trusted by both groups. The Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) in Iraq can function in just this capacity; indeed, the MEK already engages in quiet negotiations with Iraqi factions and has excellent relations with the U.S. military."